Texas Supreme Court Denies Petition in Travel Case
Davis v. Texas Mutual Ins. Co., (No. 15-0019) is one of the more interesting cases to be resting on the Texas Supreme Court’s docket. The court resolved Davis on Friday, September 4, 2015 by refusing the claimants’ petition for review. This means that the court allowed the lower court’s opinion to stand. The Supreme Court will not hear the case. You can read the court of appeals’ opinion here.
Because the Supreme Court of Texas is a court of limited jurisdiction, the filing of a case with that court does not necessarily mean that the case will be decided by that court. In fact, the court declines to hear the overwhelming majority of the cases filed with the court each year.
The issue: Course and Scope of Employment
The facts, as described in the Court of Appeals’ opinion:
A contested case hearing was held before the DWC to determine whether Ronald Davis was in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained an injury on July 19, 2009 that resulted in his death on August 14, 2009. The hearing officer determined Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained the July 19, 2009 injury. Appellants appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the DWC’s appeals panel. The appeals panel rendered its final decision, affirming the contested case hearing officer’s decision. See TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.204(c) (West Supp. 2013) (if appeals panel does not issue a decision in accordance with section 410.204, decision of the hearing officer becomes final and is the final decision of appeals panel).
The DWC’s decision and order provides in pertinent part:
[Ronald Davis] clearly went to New York City on a business trip and under the general rule would be subject to continuous coverage until the business trip ended. [Appellee] pointed out that [Ronald Davis] chose to travel to New York City on Saturday, rather than Sunday or Monday, for the Monday meeting, suggesting perhaps the trip was made for personal as well as business reasons, which would bring in the dual purpose doctrine. However, this was speculation, and there was some evidence [Ronald Davis] went early to get a better air fare.
[Appellee] also argued [Ronald Davis] made a distinct departure from the course and scope of employment on a personal errand when he sustained the injuries that resulted in his death. An employee on an overnight business trip needs to eat and sleep. Injuries sustained in the employee’s hotel or while traveling to or from (or in) a nearby restaurant are generally compensable. On the other hand, injuries otherwise sustained on a business trip generally are not. This is a question of fact. Here there was no evidence indicating why [Ronald Davis] was crossing a street near Central Park at 10:30 [a.m.] on Sunday, 8–10 blocks from his hotel, when he sustained the injuries resulting in his death.
[Appellants] had the burden of proof to show that at the time of the injury [Ronald Davis] was engaged in an activity that furthered the Employer’s business. As noted above, when the employee is on a business trip out of town, staying in a hotel and eating are activities that further the Employer’s business. [Ronald Davis] was not in the hotel or at a restaurant when the bicycle hit him. Maybe he was on his way to a restaurant. Maybe he was taking a walk for exercise or to visit Central Park. There was simply no evidence showing the purpose of the walk.
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[Appellants] failed to prove [Ronald Davis] was injured in the course and scope of his employment.
The DWC’s decision and order contains the finding of fact that at the time of injury, Ronald Davis was not engaged in an activity that furthered the business of his employer and the conclusion of law that Ronald Davis was not in the course and scope of his employment when he sustained the injury on July 19, 2009.
The specific controversy: Whether an employee was fatally injured in the course and scope of his employment while on a business trip to New York City. The employee was run over by a bicyclist while walking toward Central Park for an unknown reason. The accident occurred on the day before the employee’s business meeting was scheduled to begin.
The Court of Appeals’ resolution: The Court of Appeals concluded that the insurance carrier was entitled to judgment as a matter of law:
Here, the evidence established that pedestrian Ronald Davis was injured when he was struck by a bicycle while crossing a street ten blocks from the hotel where he was staying. The accident occurred at approximately 10:30 a.m. on a Sunday morning. Appellants had the burden to establish that Ronald Davis was acting in furtherance of his employer’s business and was not on a personal errand or mission at the time of the accident. Appellants offered no evidence to carry their burden. Accordingly, under the standard of review which we must apply, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of appellee or by denying appellants’ motion for summary judgment. We resolve appellants’ sole issue against them, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The meaning of the decision: The Supreme Court’s denial of the Davis’ petition for review can mean one of several things. First, and foremost, it means that the Davises were unable to convince four out of the nine Justices of the Supreme Court that their petition should be granted. This does not necessarily mean that the full court believed that the Court of Appeals’ analysis was correct in every respect. But it is a pretty good indication that the Supreme Court believed one or both of two things: 1) that the result reached by the Court of Appeals was correct, even if the the reasoning used by the court was questionable; and/or 2) that the issue involved in the case was not sufficiently important to the jurisprudence of the State of Texas.
We doubt that the court in Davis believed that the case was insufficiently important. Moreover, based on our firm’s understanding of Texas law, as it has developed regarding travel out of town on overnight business trips, a proper application of the burden of proof required the Court of Appeals to conclude that the claimants failed to prove that Davis was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his fatal accident.
FOLIO
