AP Find Fatal Motorcycle Accident to be in the Course and Scope of Employment
The appeals panel has reversed the decision of an ALJ and rendered a decision that an employee’s fatal accident while traveling from his home to his fixed place of employment occurred while in the course and scope of his employment. The appeal is posted in Texas Division of Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel Decision No. 171936, decided October 5, 2017.
The employee died when the motorcycle he was riding was struck by another vehicle. On the day of the accident, the employee arrived at the workplace and began his workday at approximately 6:58 a.m. However, he left the workplace at 7:03 a.m. to return to his residence to retrieve a laptop computer, owned by his employer and used in the performance of his duties, which he had forgotten to bring with him to work that morning. While traveling back to the office, he was involved in the motor vehicle accident that resulted in his death. The determinant issue is whether the employee’s travel at the time of the motor vehicle accident was in the course and scope of employment.
The ALJ determined that the accident did not occur while in the course and scope of employment. In the Discussion section of her Decision and Order, the ALJ indicated that there was no evidence that the decedent was required to return to his residence to retrieve his laptop computer and that, for such reason, “his travel was not in the course and scope of his employment.” The appeals panel reversed that decision and rendered a decision that the accident occurred in the course and scope of employment.
The appeals panel first observed that the general rule is that an injury occurring in the use of the public streets or highways while an employee is traveling to or from work is not compensable, citing American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 303 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1957). The rule is known as the “coming and going” rule. The appeals panel distinguished this case from Coleman.
While the decedent’s supervisor testified that the decedent did not need his laptop to connect to the company network and that the decedent could access such information from another computer at the workplace, he also indicated that the decedent would need his laptop to access information stored on its hard drive. The decedent obviously believed it necessary to have access to his assigned computer at work that day as there is no evidence of any personal or other purpose which was furthered by his travel back to his residence after beginning his workday on (date of injury).
Under the specific facts of this case, the decedent’s workday began when he accessed the workplace on (date of injury), at 6:58 a.m. His travel to and from his residence after having begun his workday was for the purpose of retrieving his assigned laptop computer which he deemed necessary for the performance of his duties at work that day. Such travel was not simply transportation to and from the place of employment but was travel that both furthered the employer’s business and originated in such business. We hold that the ALJ’s determination that the decedent was not in the course and scope of his employment when involved in the motor vehicle accident on (date of injury), to be incorrect as a matter of law and against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We accordingly reverse the ALJ’s decision and render a new decision that the decedent did sustain a compensable injury on (date of injury), that resulted in his death; that the decedent was in the course and scope of his employment when he was involved in a motor vehicle accident on (date of injury); and that the claimant beneficiary is entitled to reimbursement for burial benefits from the carrier.
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