Court Finds Parking Lot Injury not in the Course and Scope
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals has concluded that an employee who was injured when she stepped in a pot hole in an employer-owned parking lot on her way to work was not in the course and scope of employment. The case, City of Corpus Christi v. Muller and Muller. No. 13-18-00443-CV (Corpus Christi, June 6, 2019), was decided in the context of a suit against the employer that alleged negligent failure to maintain the parking lot.
Marie Muller was employed by the City through a temporary staffing agency, and she worked at City Hall in Corpus Christi, Texas. Around 8:00 a.m. on or about October 13, 2015, Marie parked in the City Hall parking lot and began to walk towards City Hall to report for work. During her walk through the parking lot, Marie stepped into a pot hole, fell, and suffered injuries. She brought suit against the City under a premises liability theory pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act, and her husband, Dean, brought a claim for loss of consortium.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the City was Marie’s employer and that, because Marie’s injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment, Marie’s remedy was limited solely to the benefits under the workers’ compensation insurance offered by the City. The trial court denied the city’s plea and the city filed an interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals.
The court first observed that an injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act and subject to the exclusive remedy bar if it arises out of and in the course and scope of employment. It noted that the Act defines course and scope of employment as “an activity of any kind or character that has to do with and originates in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that is performed by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer. Thus, the court observed that the long-standing rule is that to be considered within the course and scope of employment, the employee’s injury must (1) relate to or originate in, and (2) occur in the furtherance of, the employer’s business.
The court wrote that the general rule in Texas is that travel to and from work is not considered to be within the course and scope of the employee’s employment. however, an exception to this rule lies in the “access doctrine,” where “the employer has evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be used by the employee in going to and from work, and where such access route or area is so closely related to the employer’s premises as to be fairly treated as part of the premises.”
The court noted that Texas courts have repeatedly held that, in order for the employee to be considered to be in the course of his or her employment, there must be some intention by the employer, explicit or implicit, that the employee use that particular access route. In this case, the court wrote, that evidence was lacking.
Here, appellees contend that the City failed to introduce any evidence that the City intended or authorized Marie to park in the City Hall parking lot and that the parking lot is open to the general public. We agree. The City presented no evidence along with its plea indicating that the City implicitly or directly intended, authorized, or instructed Marie to use the City Hall parking lot as her access route to work.
The court agreed with the trial court and affirmed the judgment denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction.
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