Man Who Fell from Singapore Hotel Balcony was not in Course & Scope of Employment
The Eastland Court of Appeals has affirmed a summary judgment granted in favor of a carrier in a case involving an employee who fell six floors from the “balcony” outside his hotel window after a night of drinking with co-workers. In Riggs v Old Republic Ins. Co., No. 11-18-00276-CV (Oct. 1, 2020), the Court determined there was no evidence showing that the employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he fell from the sixth floor of his hotel.
The case also reaffirms that unappealed findings of fact are distinct from “issues decided” and that judicial review is limited to issues decided by the appeals panel rather than to unappealed fact findings.
Flahive, Ogden & Latson lawyers Bobby Stokes and Colin Moore represented the carrier at trial and on appeal.
In October 2012, 3M was starting a new production facility in Tuas, Singapore. Employees from 3M’s Brownwood facility assisted in setting up the new facility. The company provided rooms for its employees at the Swissotel and a shuttle service to transport the employees from the hotel to the plant.
Ernest Riggs, an employee of 3M, traveled from Texas to Singapore on October 6, 2012, to assist with the new facility. Riggs arrived in Singapore on October 7th and had breakfast at the hotel. He stated that he was tired after a long day of travel, and he retired to his room for a nap. That evening, Riggs attended a “cocktail hour” with other employees at the hotel’s executive lounge. Kenneth Campbell was with Riggs in the lounge. Campbell testified that he and Riggs stayed at the lounge from 6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. drinking beer. Campbell did not remember how many beers Riggs had consumed.
After the cocktail hour, Riggs and Campbell skipped dinner and left the hotel to go to Clarke Quay, an area near the hotel where employees would frequently sit and socialize after work. To reach Clarke Quay from the hotel, employees crossed a bridge on foot. Once at Clarke Quay, employees could buy beer from a convenience store and mingle with other Americans who were in the area for business.
Campbell testified he and Riggs stayed in the area drinking beer and chatting with a group of people from Louisiana until around midnight. The two then crossed back over the bridge to the hotel side and met up with other employees as they returned from dinner. The employees stayed at the bridge and continued to drink; Campbell testified that he had “a couple” of beers and that Riggs probably did as well. Campbell continued to stay at the bridge with the other employees, and Riggs left to return to the hotel.
Campbell did not remember Riggs slurring his speech, stumbling, or otherwise appearing intoxicated. However, Paul Barberie, one of the employees who crossed paths with Campbell and Riggs at the bridge, testified that he thought Riggs was “extremely intoxicated” and acting out of character.
The next morning, Riggs was found dead in a grassy area outside the hotel underneath the window of his sixth-floor hotel room. The court wrote that “Riggs appeared to have left his room through the window to access a balcony that was not attached to his room. Riggs died as a result of the fall.”
Riggs’ surviving spouse, Penny Riggs, filed a claim for workers’ compensation death benefits. The carrier, Old Republic Insurance Company, disputed Penny’s claim, and the DWC held a contested case hearing to decide (1) whether Riggs suffered a compensable injury and (2) whether Riggs was intoxicated at the time of the injury.
The Hearing Officer decided both issues in favor of the carrier, finding that the deceased was not injured during the scope of his employment and that the deceased was intoxicated at the time of his death. Penny timely appealed the DWC decision, and the Appeals Panel reviewed the matter and permitted the Hearing Officer’s decision to become final. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 410.204(c).
Penny then sought judicial review, asserting that Riggs suffered a compensable injury during the course and scope of his employment and that he was not intoxicated at the time of his death. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Penny filed a traditional motion for summary judgment; The carrier filed a combined no-evidence and traditional motion for summary judgment.
In its no-evidence motion, the carrier asserted two grounds: (1) that there was no evidence that Riggs was in the course and scope of his employment when he died and (2) that there was no evidence that Riggs was not intoxicated at the time of his death. After a hearing on the motions, the trial court granted the carrier’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, Penny presented two issues. In the first issue, she argued that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment because she had produced some evidence that Riggs was not intoxicated. In the second issue, Penny contended that the trial court erred in admitting an unredacted copy of the Hearing Officer’s decision.
The trial court granted the carrier’s no-evidence motion, in which it had asserted that there was no evidence that Riggs was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of death and that there was no evidence that Riggs was not intoxicated at the time of his death. Thus, Penny had the burden to produce some evidence that Riggs was acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time he fell from the sixth floor of the hotel.
In affirming the trial court’s judgment, the court wrote:
On appeal, [Penny] appears to have essentially abandoned this element. Instead, she argues that “[t]he DWC Hearings Officer found that Mr. Rigg’s [sic] business trip to Singapore originated in the business affairs of his employer” and that, because the carrier failed to challenge that finding, “it is now binding.”
It is true that the Hearing Officer made such a finding of fact and that the carrier did not raise a challenge. However, [Penny’s] reliance on the finding is misplaced. The relied-on finding is factual, and findings of fact are distinct from “issues decided.” Tex. Lab. Code Ann § 410.302(b). Here, the issues decided by the DWC were (1) whether Riggs suffered a compensable injury resulting in his death and (2) whether Riggs was intoxicated at the time of his injury. Judicial review is limited to issues decided by the appeals panel. See id. Accordingly, one of the issues before the trial court was whether Riggs suffered a compensable injury.
The test for whether an employee was injured while acting in the course and scope of his employment—and thus suffered a compensable injury—encompasses more than identifying the origin of a business trip. See, e.g., Shelton v. Standard Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex. 1965) (considering the scope of employment for an employee “whose work entails travel away from the employer’s premises”).
Instead, the general rule is that a compensable injury “(1) must be of a kind or character originating in or having to do with the employer’s work, and (2) must have occurred while engaged in the furtherance of the employer’s business or affairs.” Biggs, 611 S.W.2d at 627. Although Riggs was traveling at the behest of his employer, to be compensable, his injury must have “its origin in a risk created by the necessity of sleeping or eating away from home” and must not bear the characteristics of “a distinct departure on a personal errand.” Shelton, 389 S.W.2d at 293.
Even assuming the issue has been properly raised on appeal, the record is absent any evidence showing that Riggs was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he fell from the sixth floor of his hotel. Because [Penny] did not meet her burden to present more than a scintilla of evidence regarding course and scope, and because it is an essential element of a workers’ compensation claim that the employee was injured while in the course and scope of employment, the trial court properly granted the carrier’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. To the extent that [Penny] raises this matter in her first issue, the court overruled that issue.
The court declined to address the portion of Penny’s first issue in which she complained that summary judgment was improper to the extent that it was based upon the matter of intoxication, or her second issue in which she complained about the carrier’s summary judgment evidence, concluding that a decision on those issues was not necessary for the final disposition of the appeal.
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