Court of Appeals Rejects Division’s Interpretation of Chapter 607
In a landmark decision obtained by Flahive, Ogden & Latson attorneys, the Eastland Court of Appeals has interpreted Chapter 607 of the Texas Government Code, commonly known as the “First Responders Presumption Statute.” In the case, City of Stephenville v. Belew, the court explicitly rejected the Division of Workers’ Compensation’s construction of the statute. The court highlighted the misapplication of the statutory presumption in appeals panel decisions and the administrative phase of the case, stating, “Unfortunately for Appellees, our conclusion stands in stark contrast to the appeals panel decisions relied upon by them and the hearing officer.”
Chapter 607, Subchapter B, was introduced in the Texas Senate in 2005, with an apparent intention to apply to workers’ compensation benefits. However, the clarity of the applicability of statute on this issue is compromised, as the House, during its consideration of the bill, removed all references to workers’ compensation benefits and the Senate subsequently concurred. Notably, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission’s predecessor agency, the Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission, was not invited to testify during the bill’s passage. Additionally, Chapter 607 is not incorporated into the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (TWCA) or the Political Subdivision Law (PSL). Furthermore, its provisions were not mentioned in H.B. 7, the simultaneous 2005 revision of the TWCA, which also established the division.
Approximately ten years post-adoption, the division started applying Chapter 607 to workers’ compensation claims involving firefighters, particularly focusing on cancer. For pre-2019 injury dates, the division asserted that any cancer mentioned by the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) in its 98th Monograph triggered the presumption. Legislative amendments in 2019 limited the presumption to a specific list of cancers.
The City appealed the division’s determination that pancreatic cancer fell within the presumed cancers and that the presumption was not rebutted. The trial court affirmed the division’s determination, granting summary judgment against the City and denying the City’s own motion for summary judgment. Upon appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s summary judgment against the City, asserting errors in both motions.
The court’s detailed analysis yields conclusions with broader implications for diseases and illnesses covered by Chapter 607. The court clarified when the presumption applies to determining if a first responder’s disability or death results from a disease contracted “in the course and scope of employment,” but not if the disease “arises out of” the employment—both conditions are necessary for compensability. Importantly, Chapter 607 does not alter the definition of “injury,” which excludes “ordinary diseases of life.”
Given the determination regarding the absence of the presumption and the lack of independent evidence linking the disease to employment, the court did not reach the questions of whether Chapter 607 even applies to workers’ compensation benefits, makes compensable ordinary diseases of life, or mandates a determination of compensability when the presumption is unrebutted. They will need to be answered in another case.
While this decision sets a precedent for future cases, unfortunately, cases decided by the division under an erroneous interpretation cannot be reopened unless a timely appeal was pursued. The decision was issued on March 7, 2024, and can be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Should you have any questions about this case’s applicability to claims you are currently handling, please reach out to Jessica MacCarty (jmm@fol.com) or Roy Leatherberry (rjl@fol.com) with the firm.
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