City Failed to Prove Applicability of Access Doctrine; Loses Exclusive Remedy Defense

The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of a trial court in a premises liability claim that implicates how the access doctrine in the Workers’ Compensation Act should be applied. In City of Corpus Christi v. Muller, No. 13-18-00443-CV (Corpus Christi, June 6, 2019), the court considered an appeal by a city in which the trial court failed to grant it’s plea to the jurisdiction that rested on the exclusive remedy defense.

The case is interesting because it highlights how the access doctrine, when used defensively, can be construed narrowly to reject the compensability of a claim. However, when the doctrine is applied offensively by an injured worker, we frequently see the Division and courts construe the doctrine broadly to find a covered injury. Context, therefore, is important to the application of the doctrine.

The claimant was employed by the City through a temporary staffing agency, and she worked at City Hall in Corpus Christi, Texas. Around 8:00 a.m. on or about October 13, 2015, the claimant parked in the City Hall parking lot and began to walk towards City Hall to report for work. During her walk through the parking lot, she stepped into a pot hole, fell, and suffered injuries. She brought suit against the City under a premises liability theory pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act and her husband brought a claim for loss of consortium.

The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the City was the claimant’s employer and that, because the injury occurred in the course and scope of her employment, the claimant’s remedy was limited solely to the benefits under the workers’ compensation insurance offered by the City.

The court observed that under the Texas Workers Compensation Act recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage for a work-related injury sustained by the employee. Therefore, the court concluded, if the exclusive remedy bar provided by the Act applies to an employee’s claim against his city employer, then the city’s governmental immunity is not waived.

The question presented in this case was whether the claimant’s injury resulted from an activity of any kind or character that had to do with and originated in the work, business, trade, or profession of the employer and that was performed while she was engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of her employer.

Stated somewhat differently, the parties disputed whether the claimant was in the course and scope of her employment when she suffered her injuries. If she was within the course and scope of her employment, then the exclusive remedy bar of the Act applies, and the City’s immunity was not waived. If she was not within the course and scope of her employment, the Tort Claims Act waives the City’s immunity because the claimant suffered injuries as a result of a condition of real property.

The court acknowledged the general rule in Texas that travel to and from work is not considered to be within the course and scope of the employee’s employment. The court then described an exception to the rule known as the “access doctrine.” Under the access doctrine, the court wrote that where the employer has evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be used by the employee in going to and from work, and where such access route or area is so closely related to the employer’s premises as to be fairly treated as part of the premises.

The court wrote, “Texas courts have repeatedly noted that, in order for the employee to be considered to be in the course of his or her employment, there must be some intention by the employer, explicit or implicit, that the employee use that particular access route.” In this case, the plaintiffs argued that the City had failed to introduce any evidence that the it intended or authorized its employee to park in the City Hall parking lot and that the parking lot is open to the general public.

The court agreed that the City had presented no evidence along with its plea indicating that the it had implicitly or directly intended, authorized, or instructed its employee to use the City Hall parking lot as her access route to work. Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.