Claimant’s Fatal MVA was Not in the Course and Scope of his Employment
The Amarillo Court of Appeals has concluded that a trial court correctly ruled that an employee of a construction company was not in the course and scope of his employment when the company-owned vehicle he was driving left the highway and rolled over killing him and injuring another passenger. The case, Steen v. Texas Mutual Ins. Co.. No. 07-18-00054-CV (Amarillo, August 29, 2019), was decided in a bench trial.
Chuck Dorrity was the owner of Caprock, a “dirt contracting” company doing oil field work. Caprock employed Steen as a motor-grader operator. Caprock assigned Steen a company pickup truck which he used for “both work and personal reasons.” Although Dorrity and Steen lived in Lubbock, Caprock’s office was in Greenwood, Texas, outside Midland. Evidence showed Dorrity did not go to the Greenwood office daily and generally did not require Caprock employees to do so either if a job was not in progress.
The evidence shows that on the date of injury roadways in the Lubbock-Midland area were icy. At approximately 8:00 a.m. that day Steen was driving southbound in the company vehicle on State Highway 137 in Martin County, north of Stanton. He was accompanied by a friend, Dustin Hansen, who was also from Lubbock. Steen encountered an icy patch of pavement and lost control of the vehicle, which left the highway and rolled over. Steen died of his resulting injuries. Hansen sustained injuries but recovered.
The location of the accident was between Steen’s home and Caprock’s office in Greenwood. The carrier denied the claim for death benefits on that basis that the injury did not occur while in the course and scope of his employment.
An administrative law judge for the Division of Workers’ Compensation found that Steen was not in the course and scope of employment at the time of his death. The decision was affirmed by the appeals panel without opinion. Steen’s surviving widow then challenged the adverse administrative decision by filing a petition for judicial review in district court. After a hearing the district court rendered judgment affirming the Department’s determination.
The beneficiary contended that Steen was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, in reliance upon Hansen’s testimony that he and Steen were traveling to meet Dorrity for an interview for Hansen’s possible employment by Caprock. The trial court issued findings of fact which included the following:
• Billy Steen, Deceased (hereinafter “Decedent”), was employed by Caprock Construction as a motor grader operator on February 23, 2015.
• In late February 2015, Caprock Construction’s business was down and the company did not have any jobs.
• Dorrity was not hiring any new employees in February 2015, and if he needed to hire a new employee in February 2015, he already knew of people looking for a job.
• In February 2015, Decedent asked Dorrity to talk to a friend of Decedent’s, Dustin Hansen, who was a blade operator. As a courtesy to Decedent, Dorrity agreed to talk to Hansen at some unspecified time in the future, but also informed Decedent that he already had an employee with Hansen’s skills, he did not need anyone else, and he was not planning on hiring anyone else.
• Dorrity did not set up a specific time or place to interview Hansen.
• The employer’s office is in Greenwood, Texas. Dorrity did not go to the Greenwood office on a daily basis and did not expect employees to go in to the office when there were no jobs going on.
• On February 23, 2015, Dorrity did not plan to be at the Greenwood office but was staying in Lubbock.
• Dorrity had no plans to interview Hansen on February 23, 2015.
• Decedent died as a result of a motor vehicle accident which took place on February 23, 2015. His passenger, Dustin Hansen, survived.
• Decedent’s job duties did not include locating potential employees or arranging interviews with potential employees. Transporting a potential employee to an interview with the employer was not part of Decedent’s job duties nor was it a condition of his employment.
• Dorrity did not ask Decedent to arrange an interview with Hansen nor did he ask Decedent [to] bring Hansen to meet him for an interview.
• At the time of the accident, Decedent drove a Ford F-350 truck owned by Caprock Construction. He used the truck for both business and personal reasons.
The court wrote that to come within the general definition of course and scope of employment an injury must both (1) relate to or originate in, and (2) occur in the furtherance of the employer’s business. It reasoned that the burden to prove the “origination” and “furtherance” elements rests on the injured worker.
The court found that Caprock provided Steen a company vehicle and permitted both work-related and personal use of the vehicle. While the court wrote that transportation to and from the place of employment generally is excluded from the course and scope of employment, it observed that the statute excepts from that exclusion transportation to and from the place of employment if it is provided by the employer as part of the contract of employment or is paid by the employer.
However, even if the exception for employer-provided transportation is met, the injured worker must still satisfy the statutory “originate in” and “in furtherance of the employer’s business” elements of the general definition of course and scope of employment.
At trial the carrier argued the evidence did not establish where Steen and Hansen were traveling at the time of their accident. The court did not make a finding concerning their destination. The court of appeals found, however, that the trial court had rejected Hansen’s version of the events through its findings of fact that Dorrity did not set up a specific time or place to interview Hansen, and that Dorrity did not plan to be at the Greenwood office that day, but was staying in Lubbock.
The court also rejected the beneficiary’s argument that Steen would have been in the course and scope of his employment if he had been traveling to the office under a mistaken impression that he had successfully set up a meeting between Hansen and Dorrity.
Even were the evidence to show that Steen’s death occurred while he was traveling under a mistaken impression his friend Hansen would meet with Dorrity on their arrival at Big Lake, or Greenwood, we could not agree the record establishes that Steen’s travel had to do with and originated in the work of his employer. Driving to and from work ordinarily is not an activity originating in the work of the employer because “[t]he risks to which employees are exposed while traveling to and from work are shared by society as a whole and do not arise as a result of the work of employers.”
Similarly, the court rejected the argument that Steen had been engaged in a special mission at the time of his accident.
The trial court’s findings preclude any contention on appeal that Steen’s carriage of Hansen was an essential part of Steen’s employment. Its findings include those that Caprock’s business was down and it had no jobs at the time; Dorrity did not expect his employees to go in to their Greenwood office when there were no jobs going on; and that transporting a potential employee to an interview was not part of Steen’s job duties nor a condition of his employment. Any contention Steen was engaged in a “special mission” is likewise foreclosed in this court by the finding Dorrity did not ask Steen to arrange an interview with Hansen “nor did he ask Steen [to] bring Hansen to meet him for an interview.”
The court concluded that the evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion that at the time of the accident Steen’s fatal injury did not originate in his employer’s work, trade, or profession was supported by more than a scintilla of evidence and was not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be manifestly unjust. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
FOLIO
