Corpus Christi Court Denies Rehearing in Declaratory Judgment Case
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, denied the claimant’s motion for rehearing, withdrawn the memorandum opinion and judgment that it issued on May 21, 2015, designated that memorandum opinion as an “opinion,” and reissued that opinion without further change. The court’s opinion affirms the dismissal of a claimant’s suit for declaratory judgment arising out of a workers’ compensation claim. The reissued opinion in Harvel v. Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation et al., No. 13-14-00095-CV was posted on the court’s website June 10, 2015.
An appellate court will issue an “opinion” as opposed to a “memorandum opinion” when, in the opinion of the court, the opinion establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, or applies an existing rule to a novel fact situation likely to recur in future cases. The court may also designated its written decision as an “opinion” when the court has decided legal issues important to the jurisprudence of Texas, criticized existing law, or resolved an apparent conflict of authority. The issue presented in this case – whether a claimant can couple a suit for judicial review with a request for declaratory judgment in order to expand the force of the trial court’s judgment (and possibly entitle the claimant to fee-shifted attorneys’ fees) – is an issue that is pending before at least two other courts of appeals at this time. It appears that the court’s actions on rehearing were designed to stress the importance of the issue, and to call attention to the manner in which the Corpus Christi court resolved the issue.
In Harvel, the claimant, who is an Austin police officer, filed suit for judicial review of the Division’s final order that found that his injury did not occur in the course and scope of his employment. The suit named the Division and the Commissioner of Workers’ Compensation and the City of Austin as defendants. Officer Harvel requested that the trial court overturn the Division’s final order and determine that he was in the course and scope of his employment when another person illegally turned in front of him and caused his injuries. He challenged all adverse “findings, conclusions and decisions” of the Division and requested the trial court to determine that he is entitled to workers’ compensation benefits because his injuries were work-related.
In the same pleading, Officer Harvel sought two declarations under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act: 1) that under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act and the “Texas Peace Officer Statutes” a peace officer “is immediately in the course and scope of their employment upon observing an illegal act especially within their jurisdiction;” and that employer directed travel for purposes of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act “need not be just from one work place to another location but that an employee traveling at the direction of the employer from home to a specially assigned work location is in the course and scope of his employment while traveling.”
The trial court sustained the Division’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the agency and the Commissioner from the case. Effectively, this carved out the declaratory judgment action and dismissed it.
Officer Harvel appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling:
Both Officer Harvel’s suit for judicial review and his UDJA action seek rulings that (1) a peace officer is in the course and scope of employment as soon as the officer witnesses an illegal act and (2) that employer-directed travel for purposes of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act includes travel from the employee’s home to a specially-assigned work location. If Officer Harvel was successful on either suit he would receive substantively the same relief: reversal of the final order denying him workers’ compensation benefits. The pleadings have affirmatively negated jurisdiction because the declarations Officer Harvel seeks under the UDJA action are duplicative of his suit for judicial review. See Balquinta, 429 S.W.3d at 746; SWEPI, 314 S.W.3d at 268.
We will not afford the Association an opportunity to replead because the pleadings conclusively demonstrate the absence of a justiciable controversy between the Association and appellees. See Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 163–64 (Tex. 2004). The trial court has jurisdiction to address a suit for declaratory relief only if a justiciable controversy exists regarding the rights and status of the parties actually before the court and the declaration sought will actually resolve the controversy.
FOLIO
