Court Affirms Award of Lifetime Income Benefits; Rejects Claim for Commuted Attorneys’ Fees

The Amarillo Court of Appeals has affirmed a judgment that a county employee is entitled to lifetime income benefits under Texas Labor Code § 408.161 following a compensable head injury. The court sidestepped the county’s challenge that the judgment improperly awarded lump sum attorneys’ fees to claimant’s counsel by concluding no such order had ever been signed. The decision in Lubbock County v. Reyna, 07-19-00330-CV, January 5, 2021 decided the LIBs entitlement issue largely on procedural grounds. The court concluded the county’s challenges to the purported attorneys’ fee award were moot.

Reyna was injured in 2013 while working as a county maintenance supervisor. While attempting to repair a problem with a tractor, Reyna’s head was caught in the hydraulics, causing a significant crushing injury to his jaw and neck area. Four months after the injury, Reyna returned to work in his former position where he continued in that job until his retirement more than two years later.

Reyna sought LIBs for cognitive issues arising from his compensable injury. The county denied Reyna’s claim for LIBs. Following a CCH, an ALJ determined Reyna had suffered a traumatic brain injury but concluded the injury did not meet a definition of imbecility that would entitle him to LIBs. The ALJ’s determination was affirmed by the Appeals Panel. Both parties filed petitions for judicial review with the county appealing the inclusion of the traumatic brain injury in the compensable injury and Reyna appealing his non-entitlement to lifetime income benefits. These two causes were consolidated for trial.

The jury found Reyna had suffered a traumatic brain injury but reversed the DWC’s determination that the injury did not result in incurable insanity or imbecility. No evidence was apparently submitted to the jury on the attorneys’ fee issue. After trial had concluded, Reyna sought an order awarding him commuted, lump-sum attorney’s fees

At a hearing on attorney’s fees, the trial court granted Reyna’s motion challenging Lubbock County’s standing to challenge his claim for attorney’s fees and approved Reyna’s request for $207,000 in attorney’s fees. The final judgment, however, orders that “a lump-sum payment of attorney fees” be paid by the county out of Reyna’s benefits “in accordance with a separate order of the Court incorporated herein by reference.” However, there was no separate order specifying the amount of attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court that could be found in the appellate record.

The court of appeals concluded the county had waived its complaint that the evidence did not support the LIBs award by failing to request a motion for new trial. The county also claimed the court failed to properly charge the jury on the definition  of ”imbecility” and “incurable insanity.” The court held the county failed to preserve its right to complain regarding the way the questions were presented to the jury.

The county also challenged the trial court’s admission of certain impeachment evidence regarding its medical expert witness. The court held the county’s complaint regarding the admission of this evidence had been waived and, in any event, that admission of the impeachment evidence, if error, was harmless.

Finally, the county challenged various rulings by the trial court that resulted in its purported award of attorney’s fees in favor of Reyna. The court rejected the county’s appellate challenges because the judgment had become final without the presence of a separate written order awarding the attorneys’ fees. The court concluded this rendered the county’s challenges moot. The court wrote that any complaint by the claimant challenging the trial court’s failure to enter an award of attorney’s fees should have been raised by way of a motion for new trial or motion for correction, modification, or reformation of the judgment filed at a time when the trial court retained plenary power over the case. Claimant failed to obtain an order awarding lump sum attorneys’ fees and failed to complain about the absence of such an order. Accordingly, the county’s challenges in this regard were moot: “We cannot reverse an order not entered by the trial court.”