El Paso Court of Appeals Clarifies Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Evidence
In Croysdill v. Old Republic Insurance Company, 08-21-00191-CV (Tex. App. 2022), the El Paso court of appeals has clarified the admissibility of expert evidence in a workers’ compensation case. In doing to, they affirmed the trial court’s decision to strike Claimant’s expert witness.
The issue before the trial court was whether the compensable injury extended to and included chronic lumbar radiculitis. Croysdill offered Lois Hawkins as an expert on life care planning to testify on a life care plan she prepared on behalf of Croysdill. The life care plan consisted of an assessment of Croysdill’s possible future medical and rehabilitation care needs. Carrier filed a motion to strike Hawkins as an expert witness, contesting Hawkins’ qualifications and arguing her opinion is only relevant to Croysdill’s future medical treatment, which had no bearing on the issue before the court. Carrier also asserted that because she was only a registered nurse, Hawkins was unable to prescribe or treat Croysdill’s conditions and thus her testimony would not assist the trier of fact in answering the issue before the court.
The court of appeals first noted that Rule 702 of the Texas Rules of Evidence permits a witness to testify on technical, specialized subjects if the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. Further, the party offering the expert bears the burden to prove the witness is qualified under Rule 702. Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1996).
The court also noted that medical reports and records being offered as expert opinions must qualify under the same principles as expert testimony. State Off. of Risk Mgmt. v. Adkins, 347 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“If medical records are to be considered expert testimony, they must be evaluated applying the same principles used to evaluate the opinion of an expert.”).
Furthermore, the court emphasized that “not every licensed physician is automatically qualified to testify on every medical question. (citing Adkins). As such, the proffered expert must have knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the specific issue before the court to qualify the expert to give an opinion on that particular subject. Id.”
At the trial court level, Croysdill did not call Hawkins to testify, and he did not offer any deposition testimony or affidavits. In fact, Hawkins did not appear at all, and the trial court was thus unable to verify her qualifications, expertise, or the reliability of her conclusions. Moreover, Hawkins was not shown to be a medical professional who possessed expertise on the very diagnosis at issue—chronic lumbar radiculitis. The trial court was merely presented with Hawkins’ resume and her life care plan, without explanation or basis as to how she reached her conclusions. Her report was relevant to future life care planning, which was not at issue or relevant to whether chronic lumbar radiculitis extended from and was a result of the 1997 injury.
Consequently, the court concluded Croysdill failed to establish Hawkins was qualified and that she possessed the knowledge, skill, experience, training or education regarding the specific issue before the trial court. See Adkins, 347 S.W.3d at 402. Accordingly, Hawkins’ testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 702. The court of appeals thus held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Hawkins as an expert witness.