Houston Court of Appeals: Claimant Failed to Establish Timely SIBs Applications
The First Court of Appeals has concluded that a SIBs claimant failed to prove that his SIBs applications were timely and, therefore, the trial court correctly granted the carrier’s no-evidence summary judgment motion. In Patterson v. Transcontinental Insurance Co., No. 01-15-00464-CV (Ct App—Houston [1st], April 19, 2016.), the appeals panel held that the claimant had failed to establish that any of his SIBs applications were timely filed and that the Carrier had not waived its challenge to his failure to timely apply for SIBs for those quarters. See id. § 130.104(c) (requiring that application for SIBs be filed seven days before the beginning of the quarter for which SIBs are sought).
On appeal, the claimant challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction, arguing that the judgment had not been filed with the Division for at least 30 days prior to the date the trial court signed the order. The court of appeals rejected this argument:
Section 410.258 of the Labor Code requires a party who sought judicial review of an administrative appeals panel’s decision to submit any proposed judgment to the Department at least thirty days before judgment is scheduled to be entered. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a). Any judgment entered without this notice is void. Id. § 410.258(f); Metro. Transit Auth. v. Jackson, 212 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. App.―Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied).
We presume, however, that the judgment of the trial court is regular and correct. S. Ins. Co. v. Brewster, 249 S.W.3d 6, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing McElyea v. Parker, 81 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1935)); Casillas v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., 146 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.). In accordance with this presumption, a party challenging the trial court’s judgment must demonstrate any irregularity in the judgment under review from the trial court record. See Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14.
The trial court’s final judgment bears two stamps indicating that it was received by the Department on December 15, more than a month before it was signed on January 26. It also recites that “notification to the [Department] was made pursuant to Texas Labor Code § 410.258.” Thus, the record reflects that the Department received notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson nevertheless insists that a document exists in which the Department certified that a search of its records could not locate notice of the proposed judgment. Patterson has not identified this document in the record, nor has he presented it to us under our authority to consider matters beyond the record in determining our jurisdiction. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.220(c) (West 2004); TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 14. We conclude that Patterson has failed to rebut the presumption that the judgment is valid; thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to render its judgment. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.258(a); Brewster, 249 S.W.3d at 13; Casillas, 146 S.W.3d at 738.
Next, the claimant challenged the judgment on the merits, arguing that he had raised a fact question regarding the timeliness of his SIBs applications. The court of appeals ruled in the carrier’s favor with respect to this argument:
The administrative decisions find that Patterson failed to timely apply for SIBs for the contested quarters. The record lacks any summary judgment evidence of the date Patterson applied for benefits in contravention of the facts found in the administrative hearing decisions. Patterson bore the burden of producing evidence to establish that an issue of material fact existed. See Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 582. In his brief, Patterson complains that Transcontinental has deliberately withheld information and documentation from him and thus his failure to adduce facts to support his claim of timely filing must be excused. Patterson has not supported his allegation with legal authority or citations to the record demonstrating any obstruction of the discovery process or spoliation of evidence. Without any supporting evidence, Patterson’s claim of justification for his lack of evidence is not preserved for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Rocha v. State, 464 S.W.3d 410, 418 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).
Because Patterson produced no evidence to support his assertion that he timely filed the applications, we hold that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Tamez, 206 S.W.3d at 582; Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 524.
The claimant pursued his suit for judicial review pro se, or without the aid of an attorney. The court of appeals observed that “pro se litigants . . . must follow the same procedural rules as licensed attorneys, including the rules governing summary judgment proceedings.” The claimant’s failure to controvert the carrier’s no-evidence summary judgment motion was fatal to his case.
FOLIO
