Now San Antonio! Another Court of Appeals Reverses a Declaratory Judgment Claim
The San Antonio Court of Appeals has joined two other courts in reversing declaratory judgments filed by injured workers who sought broad declarations regarding the law in their suits for judicial review from DWC decisions. In Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation v. Brumfield (No. 04-15-00473-CV, May 18, 2016), the court of appeals reversed a trial court judgment in favor of the claimant and rendered judgment dismissing the claims against the Division.
After sustaining an injury in a motor vehicle accident, Brumfield filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, which the carrier disputed on the basis that the claimant was not a covered employee. At a CCH the evidence showed that Brumfield applied for a truck driver position with Double M Services and completed the application and other documentation. Double M Services had a co-employment agreement with E Employers Solutions, Inc. (eESI), which provided that no worker would be deemed an employee covered by eESI’s Workers’ Compensation insurance until after Double M Services submitted a completed employment packet to eESI and eESI had reviewed the packet and affirmed, by issuing an employee identification number, that the worker was an employee of eESI. Before eESI received Brumfield’s employment application and other documentation and affirmed that Brumfield was an employee, Brumfield suffered the injury that resulted in the filing of his workers’ compensation claim. The Division issued a decision that Brumfield was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits from the carrier because Brumfield was not a covered employee at the time of his injury and his injury was not compensable. The decision was based on the client services agreement and section 91.0012 of the Texas Labor Code, which defines a “covered” employee. Brumfield appealed the hearing officer’s decision to an administrative appeals panel which upheld the denial of benefits.
Brumfield then filed suit for judicial review of the Division’s decision and relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. In his petition, Brumfield named three defendants: Zurich American Insurance Company, who was the workers’ compensation insurance carrier; the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation; and Commissioner Ryan Brannan, in his official capacity.
The Division and the Commissioner pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing that the judicial review and UDJA claims against them were barred by sovereign immunity. The Commissioner also argued that Brumfield’s UDJA claims did not fall within the ultra vires exception. Alternatively, the Division and the Commissioner argued the UDJA claims were barred by the redundant remedies doctrine and, to the extent Brumfield’s UDJA claims concerned other workers, the claims were not ripe. Brumfield opposed the plea to the jurisdiction. The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction. The Division and the Commissioner then appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on every point in the Division’s appeal.
The Division argues that because no clear and unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity exists in the Labor Code, the Division cannot be a party to a suit for judicial review in a worker’s compensation case. According to the Division, the proper adverse party in Brumfield’s suit for judicial review is the worker’s compensation carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company. In response to this argument, Brumfield does not direct us to anything in the Labor Code, or any other statute for that matter, showing that the Legislature has waived sovereign immunity for Brumfield’s claim for judicial review. In the absence of a clear and unambiguous waiver of the Division’s immunity from Brumfield’s claim for judicial review, we conclude this claim is barred by sovereign immunity.
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Here, by contrast, Brumfield does not challenge the validity of any statute; instead, he seeks interpretations of the statutes and the agreement that form the basis of the workers’ compensation decision against him. Thus, when construed in his favor, Brumfield’s pleadings fail to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating the trial court’s jurisdiction over the above-referenced UDJA claims.
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Brumfield’s pleadings regarding the Commissioner simply state that he “acted beyond [his] statutory authority in failing to properly apply, interpret, and enforce the statute and rules for which declaratory relief is sought.” Brumfield’s pleadings fail to include any specific facts indicating that the Commissioner acted without legal authority or failed to perform a purely ministerial act. Rather, the focus of Brumfield’s allegations is a discretionary act—the Division’s decision to deny his claim for workers’ compensation. Complaints that an official reached a wrong result when exercising its delegated authority are insufficient to state an ultra vires claim of exceeding statutory authority. Thus, Brumfield’s pleadings affirmatively demonstrate that his claims against the Commissioner do not fall within the ultra vires exception.
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When a plaintiff invokes a statutory means of attacking an agency order, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over an additional claim under the UDJA that would merely determine the same issues and provide substantively the same relief as the statutory remedy. Here, the above-referenced UDJA claims seek the same substantive relief as the judicial review claims: reversal of the decision denying Brumfield workers’ compensation benefits. Therefore, independent of sovereign immunity, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over the above referenced UDJA claims under the redundant remedies doctrine.
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A case is not ripe when its resolution depends on contingent or hypothetical facts, or upon events that have not yet come to pass. We agree with the Division and the Commissioner that the resolution of Brumfield’s claim concerning other workers depends upon hypothetical facts and events that have not come to pass. We conclude that, to the extent Brumfield’s pleadings seek a declaration concerning the rights of other workers, his claim is not ripe for review. [Citations omitted.]
The case is at least the third declaratory judgment case that has been filed on behalf of an injured worker by the same claimant’s attorney. The San Antonio Court’s judgment and opinion follow the reasoning of the other two decisions, although this opinion may be the most expansive of the three opinions.
In December 2015, the Houston Court of Appeals (1st District) reversed the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the DJ action. Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation v. Green (No. 01-15-00321-CV, May 10, 2016). On May 10, 2016, following Green’s motion for rehearing, the court of appeals again concluded that the suit against the Division was barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and that the Division did not waive its sovereign immunity from suit by filing an intervention in the underlying lawsuit.
Last year the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in Harvel v. Texas Department of Insurance— Division of Worker’s Compensation, No. 13– 14–00095–CV (June 11, 2015, pet. filed). Harvel is currently pending on motion for rehearing to the denial of petition for review at the Texas Supreme Court.
FOLIO
