State Employee Injured While Working at Home Held Not in Course & Scope of Employment
The San Antonio Court of Appeals has determined that a state employee, who alleged that she was injured in her own kitchen while working from home, was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the injury. The case follows the Decision of the Texas Supreme Court to remand the case to the lower court in State Office of Risk Management v. Martinez, (No. 16-0337). The Supreme Court had held that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to address the State’s argument that two state statutory provisions precluded Martinez’ recovery as a matter of law.
The latest Decision, issued by the Court of Appeals on November 7, 2018, agreed with the State’s argument that Martinez’ claim was not compensable. A full understanding of the Court of Appeals’ latest ruling requires a bit of background.
Edna Martinez had been employed as a Child Protective Services Specialist II with the Texas Department of Public and Regulatory Services. On Saturday, June 9, 2001, Martinez was injured when she fell in the kitchen and dining area of her own home. Martinez reported the injury to her employer and filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.
After Martinez made the claim, her employer filled out an initial accident report stating, in part, “unknown if accident happened in work area.” Martinez reported that she believed her injuries occurred as a result of slipping on moisture on her kitchen floor Martinez’s fall occurred away from her office, on premises not controlled by her employer. Martinez’ claim was disputed by the State Office of Risk Management, which administers claims reported by state employees.
At a CCH, the issues presented were 1.) Did the Claimant sustain a compensable injury on June 9, 2001; and 2.) Did the Claimant sustain disability as the result of the June 9, 2001, claimed injury, and if so, for what period(s)? At the CCH, SORM argued that Martinez violated a rule of the employer because she was working at home on the weekend without prior permission, a violation of her employer’s employment policies.
The ALJ found that Martinez did not sustain a compensable injury, and because she did not sustain a compensable injury she did not have disability. The Appeals Panel reversed the hearing officer and rendered a decision that Martinez was injured while in the course and scope of her employment. SORM sought judicial review on the same two issues. Subsequently, SORM filed a Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the argument that a compensable injury is precluded because Martinez specifically violated Texas Government Code § 658.010 and § 659.018, which regulates State employee work hours, including the location of where work may be performed. The Court of Appeals Decision held that SORM failed to raise this argument at the administrative level and was, therefore, precluded from raising it for the first time on judicial review. Martinez v. State Office of Risk Mgmt., No. 04-14- 00558-CV, 2016 WL 548115 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, February 10, 2016) (mem. op.). One judge filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Both SORM and Martinez sought review by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court rejected Martinez’ contention that the carrier was prevented from raising an argument to explain why her claim was not compensable when the argument had not first been made before the Division of Workers’ Compensation.
In this case, the “disputed issue” and the issue “decided by the Appeals Panel and on which judicial review is sought” are the same—whether Martinez was in the course and scope of her employment at the time of her accident. See id. §§ 410.021, 410.302(b). The policy ground SORM argued in the administrative process and the statutory ground it argued in its motion for summary judgment are both arguments that support resolving the issue in SORM’s favor. Consequently, SORM was free to raise them at any time. Because the court of appeals expressed no opinion on the merits of SORM’s statutory argument, neither need we. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to that court to consider the merits of Martinez’s statutory argument and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On remand to the Court of Appeals, the court examined the effect that the statutory restrictions had on the compensability of Martinez’ claim. The court rejected Martinez’ argument that the statutory restrictions merely affected the manner in which Martinez performed her work and thus did not remove Martinez from the course of her employment (“the issue is whether a state employee’s violation of state statutes relating to her employment affects the scope of her employment and thus the compensability of her injury.”) The court looked to the “plain language” of the statutory provisions to ascertain their meaning.
Section 658.010 is titled “Place Where Work Performed” and is found within chapter 658, titled “Hours of Labor.” Section 658.010 provides that an employee of a state agency “shall, during normal office hours, conduct agency business only at the employee’s regular or assigned temporary place of employment unless the employee . . .received prior written authorization from the administrative head of the employing state agency to perform work elsewhere.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 658.010(a) (emphasis added). It then continues by reiterating that an “employee’s personal residence may not be considered the employee’s regular or assigned temporary place of employment without prior written authorization from the administrative head of the employing state agency.” Id. § 658.010(b) (emphasis added). Section 659.018, titled “Compensatory Time: Place Where Work Performed,” is found within chapter 659, titled “Compensation.” Chapter 659 provides the manner in which salaries are set, overtime and compensatory time are earned, and state employees are paid. See id. §§ 659.001-659.308. Section 659.018 prohibits an employee from accumulating compensatory time if the employee’s work is “performed at a location other than the 04-14-00558-CV – 17 – employee’s regular or temporarily assigned place of employment.” Id. § 659.018(a). Similar to section 658.010, an employee may only accumulate compensatory time for any work performed “at the employee’s personal residence if the employee obtains the advance approval of the administrative head . . . .” Id. § 659.018(b). Thus, sections 658.010 and 659.018 restrict the place where state employees can work for determining the hours they have worked and whether they have earned compensatory time. That is, the employees are restricted from where they can earn compensation for the work they perform. We interpret this language as more than a regulation of the manner of doing work. It is a prohibition on where state employees can conduct agency business and where agency business can be performed without prior written authorization.
We note Martinez argues that neither section is applicable to workers’ compensation cases. First, she argues section 659.018, which relates to how employees accrue compensatory time and overtime, does not apply in this case because the date of her injury was the first day of the pay period. Thus, she was neither working overtime nor accruing compensatory time when she was injured. However, in considering whether section 659.018 affects an employee’s scope of employment by limiting where an employee may work on state business, we must necessarily examine the entire statutory scheme by considering how the Government Code deals with work hours and accrual of compensatory time. See Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009) (explaining that courts are to examine the Legislature’s words in context of the statute as a whole and do not consider words or parts of the statute in isolation).
Second, Martinez argues that sections 658.010 and 659.018 of the Government Code do not apply because they conflict with the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, specifically section 401.011(12) of the Labor Code. Section 401.011(12) defines “course and scope of employment” as including “an activity conducted on the premises of the employer or at other locations.” TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(12) (emphasis added). According to Martinez, this definition conflicts 04-14-00558-CV – 18 – with sections 658.010 and 659.018 of the Government Code, which require state employees to obtain prior written authorization before working at home. Martinez argues that there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate the Legislature intended sections 658.010 and 659.018 of the Government Code to supersede the Workers’ Compensation Act. In considering the plain language of all three statutes, we do not find that they conflict with one another. Section 401.011(12) provides a definition of course and scope of employment that includes an activity conducted on the premises of the employer and may include activities conducted at other locations. Sections 658.010 and 659.018 then limit where those activities may be conducted at other locations by providing that a state employee may work at his home if he obtains prior written authorization. We do not see these statutes as irreconcilable, and even if they were, sections 658.010 and 659.018 would control because section 401.011(12) is merely a general definition while sections 658.019 and 659.018 are specific as to where a state employee may conduct state business. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.026.
The court resolved the dispute by concluding that sections 658.010 and 659.018 of the Government Code limit a state employee’s scope of employment by mandating that the state employee obtain prior written authorization before working at home. Because the summary judgment record included Martinez’s testimony that she had failed to obtain prior written approval from her supervisor before working at home, the court held that her injury was not compensable as a matter of law.
FOLIO
