Understanding Texas Law On Mental Trauma Injuries

The law is well settled in Texas that mental
trauma claims must be traceable to a specific time, place, and cause. Transportation
Insurance Company v. Maksyn, 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979). In Maksyn,
the Texas Supreme Court held that damage or harm resulting from a repetitious
mental traumatic activity, as opposed to a physical one, cannot constitute an
“occupational disease” for purposes of the workers’ compensation statute.

Joe Maksyn was a newspaper editor, regularly
working fifty-five hours a week and often as many as sixty-five hours a week.
It was not uncommon for him to take this “pressure work” home with him to
complete on nights and weekends. According to his testimony, his hectic
schedule ultimately caused symptoms including weakness, pressure in his head,
and feeling frightened, dizzy, and lethargic. After consistently performing his
demanding occupational duties for forty-three years, Mr. Maksyn finally
“succumbed to the pressure, mental strain, overwork, and exhaustion from his
managerial duties which culminated in hypertension, nervousness, vertigo,
anxiety depression, and disability” to complete his work. While there was a
vast array of evidence that mental stimuli produced the condition, there was no
evidence that his “anxiety depression” was the result of any repetitious physical
traumatic activity.

The Court discussed the statutory revisions
effected in 1971, when the legislature scrapped its exhaustive list of
compensable occupational diseases in favor of a general definition of the term.
(“‘Occupational Disease’” . . . shall be construed to mean any disease arising
out of and in the course of employment which causes damage or harm to the
Physical structure of the body and such other diseases or infections as
naturally result therefrom . . . ‘Occupational Disease’ shall also include
damage or harm to the Physical structure of the body occurring as the result of
repetitious physical traumatic activities extending over a period of
time and arising in the course of employment . . .”)(emphasis added).

However, even after the implementation of the “new
law” reforms in 1989, it remained “the express intent of the legislature that
nothing in this subtitle shall be construed to limit or expand recovery in
cases of mental trauma injuries.” Based on this history, the Court held that
mental stimuli alone are not sufficient to qualify a mental trauma injury as an
“occupational disease” within the statutory definition, although they could
allow for recovery based upon an accidental injury if supported by evidence of
an “undesigned, untoward event traceable to a definite time, place, and cause.”
580 S.W.2d at 337-37. The Court cited an Arizona decision Ayer
v. Industrial Commission for the proposition that “a disabling mental
condition brought about by the gradual buildup of emotional stress over a
period of time and not by an unexpected injury causing event is not compensable
unless accompanied by physical force or exertion” of some sort. Lacking
any evidence of a physical traumatic activity, the Court found that Mr.
Maskyn’s mental trauma injury was not an “occupational disease” and thus was
not compensable.

In addressing mental trauma claims, the Appeals
Panel of the Texas Division of Workers’ Compensation has repeatedly emphasized
that the claimant bears the burden of proof; specifically, it is incumbent upon
the claimant to prove (1) an injury stemming from a definite time, place, and
event (2) within the scope of employment (3) that did not emanate from a
legitimate personnel action.  In Appeals Panel Decision
No. 970292, the claimant, an assistant at a bank, was on a personal phone
call when her boss confronted her by asking “are you still on that phone call?”
in a raised voice, the tone of which she found “disconcerting.” She
subsequently experienced a “shutdown” and was diagnosed with post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) with major depression. Evidence adduced at trial
indicated that she had exhibited signs of emotional instability prior to the
incident, in the form of mood swings and crying spells; one coworker described
her as being on an “emotional rollercoaster” and another testified that she was
“moody and shaking” a lot. A psychiatrist who treated her testified that the
stressor that caused her PTSD was “the ongoing, repeated anxiety and stress of
this situation” but later stated that the stress had actually been building
over a longer period of time. The Appeals Panel found that the hearing officer
did not err in determining that the incident complained of (the “disconcerting”
comment) constituted a “legitimate personnel action” and making a finding of
fact, which was sufficiently supported by the evidence, to that effect.

Another decision issued by the Appeals Panel is
illustrative. Appeals
Panel Decision No. 060176 involved a claimant employed as a juvenile
correctional officer (JCO), the written job description of which explicitly
warned of “stressful conditions, with possible occurrences of extreme
heightened stress.” After about a month on the job, the claimant notified her
supervisor about an incident she witnessed involving misconduct (evidently,
sexual abuse) between staff and students on the employer’s premises. The
employer did not follow up on the report, and the claimant reports being
subjected to retaliatory harassment and threats by other staff members and the
superintendent after making the allegations. Specifically, she stated that the
superintendent threatened her with a misdemeanor criminal action premised upon
her failure to submit a written report detailing her observations. She
testified that she became a “nervous wreck” and began experiencing extreme
anxiety and panic attacks as a result of the work-related stress. Her doctor
identified that she was “suffering from major depression, anxiety, insomnia
resultant from work situation” and recommended extended stress leave.

In rendering its decision, the Appeals Panel cited
GTE
Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, in which the Supreme Court reinforced its
prior holding of Maksyn that repetitive mental trauma resulting in
injury does not constitute a compensable “occupational disease” under the Act.
The GTE court further reemphasized that “when there is no evidence of a particular
event causing the mental injury, there can be no recovery under the Act.” The
Appeals Panel reversed the hearing officer’s determination of a compensable
mental trauma injury, finding that there was insufficient medical evidence to
relate the asserted medical condition to a definite time, place, and cause in
the course and scope of her employment. In doing so, it relied heavily on
language scattered throughout medical reports referring to “recent developments
at work” and “actions of the employer” that allegedly caused the condition;
such phrases indicated that the mental trauma injury was not traceable to a
particular time, place, and cause, but instead represented a culmination of multiple
incidents in a work environment that produced gradual and ongoing stress. Based
on the finding that the condition was not traceable to a definite time, place,
and cause, and thus was not compensable, the Appeals Panel stated that there
was no need to reach the question of whether the alleged singular
stress-producing incident was a legitimate personnel action.